IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Naarl Richard,) C/A No. 0:11-1192-JFA-PJG
	Petitioner,)
VS.)
J. Al Cannon, Jr.,) REPORT AND) RECOMMENDATION
	Respondent.)))

The petitioner, Naarl Richard ("Petitioner"), proceeding *pro se*, brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This habeas corpus matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) DSC. Petitioner is a federal pre-trial detainee and files this action *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the Petition in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed.

INITIAL REVIEW GENERALLY

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* Petition filed in this case pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, § 1915A, the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (*en banc*); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir.

1979). This court is charged with screening the petitioner's habeas petition and attachments to determine if "it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4 of Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; see also Rule 1(b) of Rules Governing § 2254, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (a district court may apply these rules to a habeas corpus petition not filed pursuant to § 2254).

This court is required to liberally construe *pro* se petitions. <u>Erickson v. Pardus</u>, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). *Pro* se petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, <u>id</u>; <u>Gordon v. Leeke</u>, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a *pro* se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. <u>Hughes v. Rowe</u>, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); <u>Cruz v. Beto</u>, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro* se petition the petitioner's allegations are assumed to be true. <u>Erickson</u>, 551 U.S. at 93 (citing <u>Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly</u>, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).

However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). The mandated liberal construction afforded to *pro se* pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so; however, a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999), construct the petitioner's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993),

or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, <u>Beaudett v. City of</u> Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner has pending criminal charges in this court. See United States v. Richard, Criminal Action No. 2:09-992-PMD. This Petition appears to be the second habeas petition that Petitioner has filed seeking to collaterally challenge rulings and events from his pending criminal case. See Richard v. Pritchard, et al, C/A No. 0:10-2022-PMD (seeking to challenge via a habeas corpus petition certain pre-trial rulings by the district judge in his criminal case, United States v. Richard, Cr. No. 2:09-992-PMD). As explained by the Honorable Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior United States District Judge, pre-trial habeas relief is available only in rare circumstances and "'[i]t is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial." See id., Order, dated Mar. 7, 2011, ECF No. 34 at 4 (quoting Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1918)). Judge Duffy found that regular judicial procedures should be followed in Richard's pending criminal case and dismissed Richard's petition. Richard's criminal case is still pending and Richard has again presented no exceptional circumstances. Thus, for the same reasons discussed by Judge Duffy in C/A No. 0:10-2022-PMD, this matter is premature.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the court recommends that the § 2241 Petition be dismissed without prejudice. See Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (federal district courts

have duty to screen habeas corpus petitions and eliminate burden placed on respondents caused by ordering an unnecessary answer or return); Baker v. Marshall, 1995 WL 150451 (N.D. Cal., March 31, 1995) ("The District Court may enter an order for the summary dismissal of a habeas petition if it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in this Court."); and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

Paige J. Gossett

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

July 1, 2011 Columbia, South Carolina

Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." <u>Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.</u>, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).